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The Problem of Jurisdiction 
 
Lamenting that “[j]urisdiction . . . is a word of many, too many, 
meanings,”2 the Supreme Court recently has pressed a deliberate agenda 
to bring sense to the term by circumscribing its application and by calling 
for care and thoughtfulness in using it.3 Yet this approach, which started 
as a productive effort to call attention to and reduce profligate and 
unthinking use of the term jurisdiction,4 has re-created its originating 
problem. Jurisdiction now has three identities: (1) the “power” of a 
federal court,5 (2) a label for a defined set of effects,6 and (3) a creature 
of positive law that Congress can deploy at its whim.7  
These identities are unsustainable and at war with each other. 
Jurisdiction cannot mean “power,” for a federal court physically can 
enter a judgment without jurisdiction, and that judgment can become 
binding, enforceable, and unassailable.8 A more watered-down definition 
might be “authority” to enter judgment, but a federal court has legal 
authority to enter a binding judgment on procedural grounds even while 
questioning its own jurisdiction.9 Further, the formulation of jurisdiction 
as authority renders it conceptually indistinguishable from the many 
nonjurisdictional elements—ranging from the egregious (fraud on the 
court, suborned perjury, bribed judges, a trillion-dollar judgment for 
punitive damages) to the banal (finding Title VII liability for baldness 
discrimination)—that also inform legitimate authority in character and 
                                                 
 1. Excerpted and adapted from Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. 
L.J. 619 (2017). 
 2. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017); 
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
 4. Scott Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER 
GINSBURG 137, 148 (Scott Dodson ed. 2015). 
 5. United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1623-33 (2015). 
 6. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 
 7. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). 
 8. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963). 
 9. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
16 Scholarship for the Bench [Vol. 2 
degree indistinguishable from whether, say, the amount in controversy 
exceeds a jurisdictional threshold.10 
Nor is jurisdiction merely a label for a defined set of effects. It has 
become rote that a jurisdictional requirement can be raised by any party 
or the court sua sponte any time before final judgment; is nonwaivable, 
nonconsentable, and nonforfeitable; and cannot be excused by judicial 
discretion or application of principles of equity.11 But, in truth, 
jurisdictional rules can have fewer, even none, of these effects.12 Take, 
for instance, the appellate-jurisdiction requirement of filing a timely 
notice of appeal in a civil case, which the Court has held to be 
jurisdictional.13 The statute governing the requirement allows a court to 
extend the filing deadline for good cause and even allows a court to 
reopen the time period for certain equitable reasons.14 Further, the 
jurisdictional requirement that the notice be “filed”15 is subject to a 
judicial exception.16 Finally, extensions of the deadline can depend upon 
party conduct.17 The takeaway is that these equitable, discretionary, and 
party-conduct effects do not necessarily render the appellate 
requirements nonjurisdictional. Rather, the jurisdictional line simply 
incorporates the contours created by principles of equity, discretion, and 
party conduct. In short, a line need not be straight or rigid to be 
jurisdictional. 
Finally, jurisdiction cannot be a mere positivist label that Congress 
deploys at its whim. Such deployment does no real definitional work and 
has no independent meaning other than to prescribe what effects flow 
from it, and as explained above, the jurisdiction-as-effects identity is 
itself incoherent.18 Further, a positivist identity of jurisdiction offers no 
explanation for nonstatutory doctrines, such as Article III standing, 
                                                 
 10. See, e.g., In re Courtright, No. 05-21672REF, at 4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 
2006) (mem.) (noting the defendant’s argument that the judge “lacked jurisdiction to 
award punitive damages”). 
 11. Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
 12. Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1457 (2011). 
 13. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007). 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). 
 15. Id. § 2107(a). 
 16. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268 (1988) (allowing prisoners to “file” by 
delivering to prison authorities). 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (allowing an extension if, and only if, a party timely files a 
motion). 
 18. See Scott Dodson, Defending Jurisdiction, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 85 
(2018). 
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personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, the independent-and-




I offer a different, simpler, and uniform definition: jurisdiction 
determines forum in a multiforum legal system. It is a descriptive and 
functional concept that helps allocate cases, define boundaries, and 
maintain relationships among competing forums. Importantly, 
jurisdiction does not speak to the authority of a single court in isolation, 
like a statute of limitations or standing doctrine might. Rather, 
jurisdiction defines both where a dispute belongs and where it does not. 
It is inherently a relational concept, an organizing force that either 
resolves or encourages territorial disputes within a community of forums. 
Jurisdiction provides answers to the following questions: When can a 
case be filed in federal or state court? (Original subject-matter 
jurisdiction.) When does a case move from district to appellate court? 
(Appellate jurisdiction.) Which states’ courts can hear a case and which 
cannot? (Personal jurisdiction.) Which federal districts within a state can 
hear the case? (Venue.19) Jurisdiction erects both the fences that separate 
forums and the gates that cases may pass through. 
Crucially, jurisdictionality does not depend on the mere existence of 
alternate forums. Otherwise, every judicial limit would be jurisdictional. 
Rather, jurisdiction itself must group or divide the forum possibilities. 
This key feature distinguishes, for example, statutes of limitations (which 
limit one court’s authority independent of the availability or 
unavailability of other forums) from the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens (which limits a court’s authority because of the availability of 
more convenient forums). 
Congress cannot alter this definition of jurisdiction. It is part of 
jurisdiction’s inherent nature. A sheep is a sheep, even if Congress tries 
to call it a wolf. If a limit determines forum in a multiforum legal system, 
it is jurisdictional. If it does not, it is not. Jurisdiction is definitional law, 
not positive law. 
The effects of a particular jurisdictional limit, however, are a 
different matter. Those are products of positive law. Whether a 
jurisdictional line can be influenced by party preference, judicial 
discretion, or equitable considerations ought to be considered part of 
                                                 
 19. Yes, venue is definitionally jurisdictional. I explain why in more detail below. 
For now, note that venue is a case-allocation doctrine of the same ilk as personal 
jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction. 
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lawmakers’ arsenal for maintaining workability and fairness in the legal 
landscape. Indeed, Congress has made the deadline to file a notice of 
appeal, despite its jurisdictional character, subject to principles of equity 
and to the preferences of the parties. In other circumstances, Congress 
could decide that a particular jurisdictional line is too important for 
systemic reasons to leave to the influence of the parties or the courts, and 
thus it might make the line nonwaivable, nondiscretionary, and even 
subject to sua sponte policing by the courts. The point is that positive law 
prescribes the effects for a particular jurisdictional line. 
 
Categorizing Jurisdictional Doctrines 
 
Any law that determines forum in a multiforum system, then, is 
properly typed “jurisdictional.” Some doctrines customarily considered 
jurisdictional, such as diversity and federal-question jurisdiction, easily 
fit this definition, but others customarily considered nonjurisdictional fit 
too. Exhaustion requirements, for example, determine forum by diverting 
a dispute from one forum into another. Thus, obtaining a right-to-sue 
letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before suing 
under Title VII is jurisdictional because it demarcates the line of 
authority between an executive agency and a court.20 Similarly, the 
requirement that an appellant file a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 
requirement because filing divides authority between the district and 
appellate courts. Jurisdictional doctrines include the following: 
 
 Federal-question jurisdiction;  
 Diversity jurisdiction; 
 Supplemental jurisdiction;  
 Removal and remand; 
 Appellate jurisdiction; 
 Personal jurisdiction; 
 Venue; 
 Forum non conveniens; 
 Exhaustion; 
 Abstention; and 
 The Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
                                                 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1)-(3). 
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These doctrines all share a common feature: They determine forum 
in a multiforum system. They therefore are properly described as 
jurisdictional. 
It is true that these doctrines further varied goals. Abstention and 
exhaustion typically further systemic goals like federalism, judicial 
competence, and docket control; meanwhile, personal jurisdiction and 
venue further, at least in part, litigant goals of economy and convenience. 
These differences perhaps suggest that the doctrines should have varied 
effects to implement their respective goals effectively.  
Happily, the effects are governed by positive law, which allows each 
doctrine to correctly be typed jurisdictional while still exhibiting a tailored 
constellation of effects that best suits it. Perhaps the system-centric 
abstention or exhaustion doctrines, for example, should be less amenable 
to party waiver than should the more litigant-centric doctrines of personal 
jurisdiction and venue or the Federal Arbitration Act. Likewise, some 
doctrines might be subject to equitable exceptions or discretion while 
others might not. I do not mean to try to attach the right set of effects to 
each doctrine here. Rather, my point is that these doctrines are all 
jurisdictional, even if they may have different sets of effects. 
 
Categorizing Nonjurisdictional Doctrines 
 
Any law that does not determine forum in a multiforum system 
cannot be jurisdictional. Statutes of limitations, for example, do not 
determine forum in a multiforum system. These instead speak to the 
viability of recovery in a particular court. Likewise, issues of statutory 
coverage—like the employee-numerosity requirement of Title VII—are 
claim requirements, not forum determinants. These speak to whether a 
particular case can be heard but not to case allocation among forums. A 
sample of nonjurisdictional rules includes the following: 
 
 Remedy limits, like caps on damages or injunctive relief; 
 Limitations periods; 
 Requirements for fee shifting; 
 Statutory-coverage issues, including extraterritoriality; 
 Official immunity; 
 Nonretroactivity; 
 Service of process;  
 Standards of review; and 
 Standing, ripeness, and mootness. 
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These are nonjurisdictional because they address the competency of a 
court to adjudicate a particular dispute in isolation from that court’s 
relationship with other adjudicative forums. 
These groupings make for some odd doctrinal bedfellows. Standing, 
for example, is akin to a limitations period. But this is odd primarily 
because we have tended to think of jurisdiction in terms of its effects 
rather than as a structural principle about organizing forums. Standing 
somehow seems more jurisdictional than a limitations period because it 
is a constitutional limit that cannot be satisfied by judicial discretion or 
party consent. 
But when freed from effects-based definitions, categorizing standing 
as nonjurisdictional becomes much easier, and more sensible.21 Standing 
does not determine forum in a multiforum system because it speaks only 
to the limitations of the forum court to grant requested relief, just as a 
statute of limitations or a damages cap does. That makes them both 
nonjurisdictional. If Article III limits differ from limitations periods in 
terms of relative importance, then they can exhibit different effects. 
Article III standing can have all the typical jurisdictional effects (despite 
being nonjurisdictional), mootness can admit judicial exceptions (as it 
does22), ripeness can be waivable in certain circumstances (as it appears 
to be23), and limitations periods can be subject to all sorts of party-
conduct and equitable exceptions. They are all nonjurisdictional because 
they do not determine forum in a multiforum system, but they can exhibit 




One surprising implication of this redefinition of jurisdiction is the 
resuscitation of the phrase “mandatory and jurisdictional,” once used 
widely in appellate-requirement cases24 but more recently derided as a 
“drive-by” jurisdictional phrase.25 But my proposal gives independent 
meaning to both terms. “Jurisdictional” is descriptively accurate because 
the appellate requirements define whether a case is in district court or 
                                                 
 21. It also helps explain the Court’s recent recharacterization of “prudential 
standing” doctrines as merits questions. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).  
 22. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007); 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288 (2000). 
 23. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010). 
 24. Robinson v. United States, 361 U.S. 220 (1960). 
 25. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (per curiam). 
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appellate court. Meanwhile, “mandatory” speaks to the particular effect 
of the limit at issue in the cases. A statement of the mandatory effect is 
independently necessary because the descriptive term “jurisdictional” 
does not inexorably have mandatory effect on the parties and the court. 
Thus, the phrase “mandatory and jurisdictional” addresses both the 
significance of the appellate requirement to the structural relationship 
between the district and appellate courts (“jurisdictional”) and the effect 
of the requirement in a way that resolves the case (“mandatory”). 
Another implication is the need to reconsider several of the Court’s 
recent jurisdictionality cases. Although these cases use the wrong 
approach, some nevertheless do reach the correct result. Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., for example, was correct in typing the employee-numerosity 
requirement of Title VII to be nonjurisdictional because that requirement 
does not attempt to draw boundary lines between institutions but rather 
imposes a limitation on the court’s authorization to grant relief.26 
Arbaugh was wrong, however, in stating, in dictum, that Congress could 
have made the employee-numerosity requirement jurisdictional if it had 
wished.27 To the contrary, the employee-numerosity requirement cannot 
be jurisdictional, no matter what Congress says, because it does not 
determine forum in a multiforum system. 
Other decisions, however, reach the wrong result. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen, for 
example, is incorrect in holding that the settlement-conference 
precondition to labor-dispute arbitration is nonjurisdictional.28 Instead, 
the requirement is jurisdictional because it defines when the dispute must 
be negotiated in a settlement conference and when it may go to 
arbitration. Similarly, Henderson v. Shinseki, which held 
nonjurisdictional the deadline to appeal the denial of veterans’ benefits to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,29 was incorrect because 
                                                 
 26. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513–14 (2006). Other correct results 
include Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (holding 
nonjurisdictional a statute’s limits in extraterritorial application); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (holding nonjurisdictional the Copyright Act’s 
registration precondition to filing a claim); Eberhart (characterizing as nonjurisdictional 
the deadline for filing a motion for a new trial in a criminal case); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443 (2004) (holding nonjurisdictional the deadline for filing objections to a 
bankruptcy debtor’s discharge); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) (holding 
nonjurisdictional a requirement for eligibility for attorney’s fees against the federal 
government); and Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (holding 
nonjurisdictional the deadline to file an initial Title VII charge with the EEOC). 
 27. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. 
 28. 558 U.S. 67, 83 (2009). 
 29. 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011). 
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the deadline marks the transition of the case from the Veterans’ Board to 
the Veterans’ Court. And, finally, Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Chicago, decided last Term, was incorrect in holding an 
appellate deadline nonjurisdictional simply because it was nonstatutory.30 
The jurisdictional definition is inherent; it is not dependent upon the 
source of the lawmaking authority. 
Still others correctly label the law but fail to appreciate the 
disconnect between the law’s label and its effects. Bowles v. Russell, for 
example, is correct in its jurisdictional characterization of the deadline to 
file a civil notice of appeal but not in its reasoning that the jurisdictional 
status necessarily precludes equitable exceptions.31 Whether the appellate 
deadline allows equitable exceptions is a question of positive law—a 
routine question of statutory interpretation—not a product of its 




The time has come, once again, to focus on jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
determines forum in a multiforum system. That definition is inherent and 
static; it cannot be changed by Congress. But Congress can set the effects 
of jurisdictional boundaries; jurisdiction is not irrevocably tied to a 
defined set of effects. This conceptualization leads to a more coherent 
categorization of various doctrines, resolves many doctrinal 
inconsistencies, and enables tailored application of effects. A few hard 
cases remain—the political-question doctrine and sovereign immunity 
come to mind—but my conceptualization offers a framework for 
resolving even those.33 
The challenge will be in implementation, but small steps forward are 
immediately attainable and can lead to greater change over time. Courts, 
Congress, commentators, and even litigants should reserve use of the 
term for those occasions when the law makes determinations among 
multiple forums and not use the term when the law speaks to a single 
forum in isolation. They should stop treating jurisdiction as something 
sacred, as “power,” or as tied to immutable effects, and instead focus on 
what the effects of a particular law are or should be. With thoughtfulness 
and attention, we might finally find coherence in jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
 30. 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017). 
 31. 551 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2007). 
 32. Id. at 214. 
 33. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017). 
